How to know the knower?

 

This is the view of the Upani>adic }<is. The }<is have this query: iva&atarmaro kona ivajaanaIyaat\Vij_§t§ram-are kena vij§n$yat--B&had§ra;yakop.IV.vi.15? How can the knower be known?  In other words, is it possible to know the knower?

First, what are the conditions of knowing?

One: A perceiver.

Second: An object to perceive.

Third: Perceptible magnitude.  There must be distance between the perceiver and the object to be perceived.

 A perceiver is the subject.  An object must be there to be seen by the subject.  Distance or closeness between the perceiver and the object has to be reasonable.  That is ‘perceptible magnitude’.  What are these conditions?  These conditions for perceptible magnitude are explained by S§/khya K§rik§-7:

i. Too far, an object placed beyond the range of a sense organ, ii. extreme closeness (a speck of dust in the eye), iii. impaired sense-organ, iv.  lack of mental focus,  v.  extreme subtly (e.g., an atom), vi. object being covered, hidden, and, vii. mixed up with similar object (sugar and salt).  

What is the criterion for deciding the status of objects available for perception?  This issue has been discussed in D&g-d&<ya-viveka#-2-4 as follows: 

--  'The forms (and all such other objects of senses) of perception appear as many due to such differences as blue, yellow, gross, subtle, short, long etc.  On the other hand, eyes (and all other senses in association of mind) perceive all of them ‘remaining as one and the same through various changes occurring over times’.

Changes and differences:  Objects of all senses, which are many, remain constantly in a state of flux.  They are changing all the time.  What remains unchanged is the perceiver. For example, eyes remain one and the same.  Various objects appear and disappear which are one distinct from the other.  Moreover, each object is changing constantly and senses perceive an object with changes occurring. It is possible since eyes as one unit of perceiver are (temporarily) changeless.  In addition, human senses function in coordination with mind and buddhi.  For example, for looking at a crowd, both eyes and mental attention are engaged.  And one also needs buddhi (discrimination) to identify a desired object. For example, R§ma in the crowd of similar human beings is perceived.    

Changeability is a special feature of an object. Changes in objects are possible in reference to a substratum. For example, in case of a rope which, due to bad light, is considered to be a snake. So, these changes or characteristics of a snake are superimposed (imagined) on a rope.  Whereas, in reality, these features are non-existent and therefore are imaginary.  It is also true that these perceived features are subject to further changes. 

In case of a calf, which grows into a cow, there are perceived changes in size and additional features (horn, teeth, milk etc.) which are seen by the senses despite the fact that identity of that individual animal remains the same even though there is a time lapse.

Similar is the case of a baby who grows into a young boy.  In spite of major changes over several years, the identity of that individual boy remains unchanged.  

All objects go through six types of changes.  These changes are identified by V§r>§ya;i and  expounded by Y§ska, the author of Nirukta.  These changes are:

J§yate, to take birth, (asti) to exist, (vipari;amate) undergoes changes, (apak>$yate) decays, (vardhate) enlarges, and (vina<yati) to disappear. These are the six conditions where through an object goes through. 

Such conditions and changes cannot be associated to Consciousness (personal- {tman or impersonal- Brahman) since it is a mere witness to all past and present states of existence and non-existence.  Else, none would be aware of non-existence and existence.  From I-ness to a gross object, all perceived objects have a past state of non-existence and it is Consciousness that continues to witness all states of birth, existence and disappearance of an entity.

 

It is Consciousness (Citi), which is a non-mutating single unit, that illumines (all states and functions of) mind as desire, determination, doubt, belief and non-belief, conviction and (it’s) opposite, humbleness, arrogance, understanding, fear and such others. It also witnesses what changes occur to the world out there.

Now, if perceiver is the subject who is engaged in an act of perception of an object, (logically) he (the subject, the perceiver) cannot be an object of perception (for himself) at all.  One cannot be the subject and object at the same time.

Then what is Self-realization  or {tma-j_§na or {tma-bodha – ‘knowledge’ of the Self? There are schools which consider {tma-j_§na to be the summum bonum of human life.   Is it not that, in this case Self is made into an object of ‘knowledge’?  If this is so, then who ‘gathers’ the knowledge of the Self?

‘Self-knowledge’ does not indicate to knowing the Self in the mundane sense of the word.  Since there is no other word to express the state of ‘pure and unbridled awareness of the Self’ (as is experienced in a state of Self-realization), this word ‘{tma-j_§na’ is used.  It does not mean that Self is made into an object of knowledge by a sense tool.  Moreover, it (Self-knowledge) in fact, is a process of knowing what and what ‘Self is not’.  This process is called ‘vyatireka’ (the process of exclusion) or inverse learning.  This is made use of by the sages of the Upani>ads who exclude all that is ‘non-Self’ by saying ‘neti neti’ (not this, nor that).   ‘Neti neti’ rightly states that Self is not perceivable just as an apple is perceived.  Conversely, it means that all that is perceivable is certainly not the Self.  By elimination of all perceivable what is saved is Brahman or the Self. 

Is Brahman an ‘experience’ (say, of Absolute nothingness)?  No.  In the first place it is not an ‘experience’.  All experiences are limited to senses, mind and buddhi in regards to existence and non-existence of an object or feeling etc. Brahman does not come within the scope of experience and also it is not an object available for experience.       

An example explains this typical ‘experience’ quite well. A doll made of salt goes to measure the depth of the ocean.  The doll is unable to express its experience.