Sa/bandha

 

Samav§ya

It is a necessary prerequisite to understand the concept of Sa/bandha (relationship) for grasping the theory of adhy§sa (superimposition).

Samav§ya is the most important concept and it also the corner stone of the Ny§ya-Vai<e>ika system. Samav§ya is one kind of V&tti-Niy§maka sa/bandha. The systems of Ny§ya-Vai<e>ika regard it as a separate category altogether.

Samav§ya is ‘an intimate relationship’ between two objects which are generally inseparable. This sa/bandha is found:

i) between a part and a whole (avayava and avayav$), the generic character and the individual manifestation (j§ti and vyakti),

For example, a composite whole remains in its constituent parts e.g., the cloth exists in yarns, by which it is composed.

ii) the quality and the substance qualified (gu;a and karma) and,

iii)  A generic character remains in an individual e.g., manu>yatva (humanity) exists in all human beings, gha+atva exists in all gha+as (pots). 

iv) the eternal substance and the ultimate difference (nitya and vi<e>a).  

A quality exists in a substance, e.g., a colour exists in a rose. A rose is a dravya while colour is a gu;a. An action exists in a dravya, e.g., a horse is running. A horse is dravya and running is an action. A particularity (vi<e>a) exists in a substance  which is eternal (nitya-dravya).

 

Samav§ya can be established by the following inference:

The cognition that a thing is qualified by qualities, actions etc. depends on three factors, viz., vi<e>a (something that is qualified or substantive), vi<e>a;a (the qualifier or attribute) and a relation (sa/bandha) between the two.  It is for the reason that it is the cognition of a qualified entity, like the notion of a qualified entity ‘da;*$ puru>a#’ (a man holding a staff).  

Now, this relation cannot be sa/yoga, since sa/yoga happens between two dravyas (objects)  which are separable.  But here the relation is between substance and colour or action, i.e., between the jar and its colour or the jar and its action etc. which are inseparable. It cannot be the relation of svar%pa (self-sameness) where the relation is denoted by the two relata themselves without reference to a further relation. In that case infinite numbers of relation will have to be assumed which is cumbrous. Hence, for the sake of simplicity, inherence, which is one is to be accepted. Samav§ya is eternal relation and it is one.

Samav§ya establishes relation among first five categories–dravya, gu;a, karma, s§m§nya and vi<e>a. As a whole, samav§ya is a unique device to make the metaphysical structure of the Ny§ya-Vai<e>ika system. In other words, it may be stated that when two different things inseparably connected like substance and attribute, substance and karma, substance and s§m§nya, cause and effect, atoms and vi<e>a which appear as one whole or one inseparable entity (ayutasiddha), there is the relation of samav§ya.

S.N. Dasgupta says:

“This peculiar relation of inseparable inherence is the cause why substance, action and attribute, cause and effect and j§ti in substance and attribute appear as indissolubly connected as if they are one and the same thing.”

Ka;§da gives the definition of samav§ya as that relation which is the cause of the notion that something is here (iha) as between cause and effect. Pra<astap§da defines samav§ya as that relation which is found between inseparable entities, related as the container and the contained and the cause of the latter existing in the former. If that two things are separable then the relation of that two things cannot be samav§ya e.g., a pa+a (cloth) remains in its composite tantus (yarns).  The pa+a cannot be separated from tantus. Therefore, this relation between tantus and pa+a is samav§ya.

It is also self-subsistent (sv§tmasatta) and it is marked by knowledge, effectless, causeless, eternal and nameless as objects.  In his Bh§>ya, it is found that samav§ya is one and independent but its substance and contents are different. It exists as container and contained. The genus of dravya remains in dravya, the genus of gu;a are found in gu;a, the genus of karma exists in karma.

Jayanta Bha+ta says that there is difference between the parts and the whole or a substance and its qualities etc.  But the difference of the space between these parts and the whole or the substance and its qualities etc. cannot be accepted. Hence in such cases, relation is accepted which is called samav§ya.

According to |r$dhara, that relation is called samav§ya which exists between two inseparable entities which are of the nature of container and content.  This samav§ya relation cannot remain between two entities which are able to be separated and which exist in different substrates. Separable things can exist in different substrates. A cloth remains in yarns through which it is constituted. Yarns can exist independently apart from cloth but cloth has no independent existence apart from yarns. Yarns are the container and the cloth is its content. He also states that samav§ya has existence, nature and it can be expressed by name. In different states, its essential nature can be made through the knowability and nameability.  It is also found in his work that samav§ya is known as self-subsistent. It does not accept community and does not relate to being.  It does not remain in beings through any other relation.

|iv§ditya and Ke<ava Mi<ra give similar definition.  In the Bh§>§pariccheda, Vi<van§tha states that samav§ya is the relation of a jar etc. With its two parts etc., the relation of the substance with quality and action and relation of the generic attribute with these three i.e., substance, quality and action.  In his Ny§yasiddh§ntamukt§val$, he also defines that samav§ya is an eternal relation.  The relation which exists between the parts and the whole, genus and the individual, quality and qualified, action and moving thing, particular and eternal substance-- is known as samav§ya. He also mentions that samav§ya can be inferred from the substance, quality and relation between them.

svar%pa-sa/bandha between  cause (part) and effect (whole) undermine the doctrine of asatk§ryav§da.  According to this doctrine, an effect is a new beginning (§ra/bha). It is different from its cause. The whole exists in its parts from which it is different. Hence, samav§ya is not svar%pa-sa/bandha.

i) Anna/bha++a gives the definition of samav§ya as an eternal relation. Samav§ya has no production and destruction. So, it is eternal.  He also states that samav§ya  exists in inseparable pairs (ayutasiddha).  He then proceeds to explain the term ayutasiddha.

Two things are said to be ayutasiddha (inseparable) if one of them exists as contained in other so long as it is not destroyed. This means that two things, which are in relation of inherence, cannot be separated without one of them being destroyed. For example, threads and a piece of cloth.  Here, threads are the parts, while cloth is the whole.  Threads are independent of the cloth, but the cloth is not independent of threads as the cloth exists only in the threads till it is not destroyed. These two things are called ayutasiddha and the relation between these two ayutasiddha entities is samav§ya.

ii) Similar is the relation between quality (gu;a) and qualified (dravya).  Red colour, which is a quality (gu;a) existing in a substance such as a flower is inherence.  (Hypothetically speaking) a substance can exist independently (?), quality cannot exist apart from a substance. So, they are ayutasiddha in as much as a quality, as long as it lasts, has to subsist in a substance.

iii) Similar is the relation between action (karma) and substance of which it is an action. An ayutasiddha relation between j§ti and vyakti is the fourth one.  Individual cows cannot exist independent of the universal ‘cowness’ which can exist independent of a specific cow. Therefore, they are ayutasiddha.

iv) Lastly, relation between vi<e>a and eternal substance is inherence. In his D$pik§, Anna/bha++a points out that the word nitya is added in the definition to avoid over-pervasion to conjunction.  Because conjunction is also a relation, but it being non-eternal, then is no over-pervasion. The word sambandha is given here to avoid over-pervasion to §k§<a etc.  §k§<a etc. are eternal substances, but §k§<a is not a sa/bandha.

Anna/bha++a also forwards the same argument as given by Vi<van§tha to prove the existence of samav§ya.  In his view, cognition in the form of ‘blue jar’, which is a qualified cognition, is based on the qualifier, the thing qualified and the relation between the two, as it is a qualified cognition like the cognition of ‘the man with a staff’. From this inference the existence of samav§ya can be proved.

According to Naiy§yikas, samav§ya is perceptible. But Vai<e>ikas state that samav§ya is not perceptible. It is at$ndriya (non-sensory) and anumeya (inferable). If dravyas are perceptible then samav§ya sa/bandha between those dravyas can be perceived.  But all dravyas are not perceptible.  Then their sa/bandha is also not perceptible. Samav§ya does not possess a j§ti as there is j§ti-b§dhaka called asa/bandha in case of samav§ya.

According to the Ved§ntins and S§/khya philosophers, samav§ya is not acceptable as a pad§rtha, because they believe in svar%pa-sa/bandha or t§d§tmya-sa/bandha but do not believe in five pairs of ayuta-siddha objects.

Pr§bh§karas state about samav§ya, in which two inseparable dravyas (yuta-siddha) are intimately connected with each other, that is samav§ya.  Its eternality depends upon dravyas, if dravyas are eternal, it is also eternal and ife dravyas are non-eternal, it is also non-eternal. Naiy§yikas opine that samav§ya is nitya and one. The Bh§++as and Advaitins accept  samav§ya as t§d§tmya-sa/bandha.

Samav§ya and theory of Causation

As per Ny§ya-Vai<e>ika system, reality of the is dependent upon their ‘theory of causation’ which is called the asat-k§ryav§da.  According to this theory, an effect does not exist in its cause and ‘cause and effect’ are two separate entities. For example, threads and cloth are two different objects. These two separate substances exist in one place due to relation of  samav§ya.  

According to Ny§ya-Vai<e>ika system, a material cause is known as ‘samav§y$-k§ra;a’. It means, a cause remains in its effect by samav§ya relation. Hence, samav§ya relation makes the basis of Ny§ya-Vai<e>ika theory of causation.

It may be noted here that the theory of samav§ya has, at first, been postulated as a relation of cause and effect. Ka;§da tries to explain the subsistence of an effect in its cause with the help of samav§ya.  In fact, the problem for Nyāya-vaiśeṣikas is to explain ‘how two things’, viz., cause and effect, which are separate realities, can remain occupying the same space.

Ka;§da takes help of the concept of samav§ya in order to explain the subsistence of one substance in another, in such a way that both of them occupy the same space.  However, Ka;§da has not mentioned about qualities, actions and universals residing in substances in the relation of samav§ya.  Later on, scope of this samav§ya relation spreads to the existence of qualities, movement or universals in their substances. The viśeṣa also exists in atoms or eternal substance through this relation.

Athalye and Bodas mention that:

“The conception of samavāya is in fact a key to the whole theory of causation as viewed from the Nyāya standpoint and consequently the doctrine has been strongly animadverted by writers of the Sāṃkhya and Vedāntic schools who hold different views”.

The cause and the effect are connected together inseparably, this union is called samavāya.

Sa/yoga and Samav§ya

There are some distinctions between sa/yoga and samav§ya–

(a) Sa/yoga exists between two substances. But samav§ya exists between two substances which remain as cause and effect, between one substance and one other non-substance like quality, movement etc., between two non-substances such as qualities and universals, as also movement and its universal.

(b) Sa/yoga is relation between two things which can be separated. Samav§ya exists between those things which cannot be separated. For example, the sa/yoga between a man and a stick can be separated, but in case of the samav§ya relation between effect and  cause,  effect cannot be separated from the cause.

(c) Samav§ya relation exists between two objects as container and contained (§dh§ra–§dheya-bh§va). Sa/yoga relation also abides between two substances. But in this relation,  container and contained (§dh§ra-§dheya bh§va) sa/bandha is not necessary.

“That which cannot exist without the other is always the contained (§dheya), and the other which can exist independently is always the container, the substratum, e.g., effect, qualities, etc., are always the contained and the substance in which they reside is the container or the substratum.”

In case of sa/yoga, the substance are not necessarily connected in the relation of container and contained. That means there may be the relation of container and contained, but this is not the necessary condition, as in the case of samav§ya.

(d) Samav§ya is one but the sa/yoga is many.

(e) In sa/yoga, the two related objects are distinctly perceived as two, but in samav§ya, although the related are two, they appear as one.

(f) Samav§ya is eternal because it has no production and destruction, but sa/yoga is non-eternal.

(g) Samav§ya relation is internal but sa/yoga relation is external.

(h) Samav§ya is a separate category. But sa/yoga is not a separate category; it is a division of gu;a.

Samav§ya is one and Eternal

 The Ny§ya-Vai<e>ikas generally accept samav§ya as one. Though the substrates where samav§ya resides are different, samav§ya is the same in all cases.  It is Pra<astap§da who first established refuting the opponents view that samav§ya is one only. The opponents argue that if samav§ya is one, then there will be cross-division among the categories of substance, quality, action etc. the relation of dravya, gu;a and karma with dravyatva, gu;atva and karmatva being one and the same. He refutes this view by the argument that though dravyatva and gu;atva have the same samav§ya, yet there is the different potentiality of manifestation (vya_ga–vyañjaka-<akti) on account of which there will be a restriction in the relation of the container (§dh§ra) and the contained (§dheya). Though samav§ya is one, yet there is some restriction for the different §dh§ra and §dheya. The genus of substance exists in substance. The genus of gu;a exists in gu;a. The genus of karma exists in karma.  Vi<van§tha also refers to the view of the opponents and says that it can be contended that since inherence is one, so it will give rise to the notion that air has colour. But this argument is not tenable, for although there is the inherence of colour in air, yet there is no colour in it. The reason is that in the notion of a qualified thing, the knowledge of the relation as well as of the qualifier is necessary. This relation is, therefore, not mere inherence, but the inherence of colour. The inherence of colour is absent in air and as such there is no inconsistence in accepting samav§ya as one.